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Abstract: 
In this essay I focus on the form of government defended by Marsilius of Padua in 
the first Discourse of Defensor pacis (1324). The interpretation of his overall account 
depends heavily on our understanding of the “major and valentior part” of the 
citizenry upon which all legislative and elective powers are bestowed. I argue that 
there is sufficient textual evidence to believe that the above term refers not to some 
small elite group but to the totality of citizens or the overwhelming majority of 
them. I also argue that his imaginary polity meets all the necessary conditions that 
any political regime should meet in order for it to be characterised as an essentially 
democratic one. Thus, Marsilius deserves a more prominent position in the history 
of democratic ideas. 
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Resumen: 
En este ensayo me centro en la forma de gobierno defendida por Marsilio de Padua 
en el primer discurso del Defensor pacis (1324). La interpretación de la tesis en su 
conjunto depende en gran medida de cómo entendamos la “pars major” (la parte 
mayoritaria) y la “pars valentior” (la parte más importante, de mayor peso) de la 
ciudadanía a la que le son otorgados todos los poderes legislativos y electivos. 
Sostengo que hay evidencia textual suficiente para creer que el término citado 
anteriormente no se refiere a una pequeña élite, sino a todos los ciudadanos o a la 
mayoría de los mismos. También defiendo que la forma de gobierno que imagina 
reúne todas las condiciones necesarias que cualquier régimen político debería 
cumplir para definirse como fundamentalmente democrático. Por tanto, Marsilio 
merece ocupar una posición más destacada en la historia de las ideas democráticas. 
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Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor pacis (1324), and particularly the first of the three 
Discourses2 that compose it (hereafter D.I), constitutes a unique case in late 
medieval political philosophy. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it contains ideas 
which do not merely diverge from those found in other similar works of the time, 
but which can also be seen (according to the interpretative approach that will be 
adopted here) as incorporating core elements of a form of government in which the 
people are sovereign. What impresses the reader is the way in which the 
philosopher, by making use of existing materials, mainly the works of Aristotle3 and 
the Bible, provides a coherent outline and defence of an ideal democratic polity, 
which differs considerably from the forms of government other authors were 
arguing for during his lifetime.4 In the first section of this essay I will offer a brief 
reconstruction and interpretation of the form of government Marsilius defends in 
the first Discourse of Defensor pacis and in the second I will make a case that his 
account deserves to be assigned a more prominent place in the history of 
democratic ideas. 
 
I 
 
Marsilius, having in mind the medical methodology he had probably learnt 
from Pietro d’Abano at Padua and in Paris,5 set himself the task of fighting the ‘evil’ 
that undermined the foundations of all politically organised collectivities, that is to 
say, the discord and strife that afflicted their citizens (D.I, c.1, §3). The latter 
constituted a disease that spread rapidly, corrupted all healthy –that is, calm and 
peaceful– civil communities, and prevented the attainment of the goal for which 
they had been established, which was not the salvation of the citizens’ souls but the 
protection of their lives and welfare in this world (D.I, c.3). Deliverance from such 
misfortunes might come through some form of divine intervention but such an 
eventuality did not concern Marsilius, because he thought it was not susceptible to 
rational proof; what was required was something that could be achieved through the 
human will (arbitrium) and in this respect the empirical study of the development and 
                                                          
2 In this essay I focus exclusively on the first Discourse of Defensor Pacis and it is not my intention to offer an 
overall assessment of Marsilius’ political and theological thought. Such an undertaking should take into 
account the other two Discourses, the conspicuously pro-imperial Defensor Minor as well as the philosopher’s 
personal involvement in the political developments of his time. The differences among various recent 
scholarly approaches to the Marsilian corpus are discussed in Canning (2011: 81-106). I would like to thank 
an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions. 
 
3 The presence in almost every paragraph of direct positive references to the works of the Stageirite may give 
the impression that Marsilius was not an original thinker. However, this impression is misleading. Marsilius 
selects from Aristotle those arguments that serve to support his own political proposal.  
 
4  Cf., for instance, the justification of hereditary monarchy that appears in Aegidius Romanus’ De regimine 
principum (c. 1287/1967). See also notes 12 and 17 below.  
 
5 Syros (2012: 15) and Godthardt (2012: 5).  
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structure of city-states was of crucial importance.6 However, we should bear in 
mind, as it is revealed in the last chapter of the first Discourse, that Marsilius is 
particularly concerned with what he regards as the prime cause of the political and 
social unrest in all Christian cities and kingdoms of his time: the Holy See’s ambition 
to prevail over all secular rulers. 
This investigation revealed that the smooth and peaceful functioning of a 
city-state required both a division of the practical arts that were essential to the 
livelihood of its inhabitants and also a separation of its higher civic and social 
functions. The latter include the ruling, the judicial, the advisory, the military, the 
financial and the priestly functions (D.I, c.5). Marsilius insists on strictly demarcating 
the authority of the priests, foreshadowing the harsh criticism that he makes of 
caesaropapism in the second Discourse of Defensor pacis. He hastens to make clear 
that the priestly part should be confined to “the instruction and education of men 
on the subject of those things which, according to the evangelical law, it is necessary 
to believe, do, or omit in order to attain eternal salvation and avoid eternal misery” 
(D.I, c.6, §8).7  
A correct understanding and proper establishment of these functions or 
parts of the city (except for the priestly one) is to be achieved through acquiring a 
grasp of their four Aristotelian causes. In this light Marsilius goes on to claim that 
the final cause of these functions is the self-sufficiency of the city. Their material 
cause is the citizens that serve these functions, with their diverse abilities, skills and 
dispositions. The formal cause consists in the orders that the above citizens receive 
from the efficient cause, and the efficient cause is the “human legislator” (D.I, c.7). 
The first two causes can be easily understood. The third and fourth ones, however, 
in which the originality of Marsilius’ thinking is more evident, require further 
discussion. Thus, the philosopher, after initially outlining five ways in which the 
collective or individual human will establishes the city’s ruling function, is led to an 
analysis of the concept of law. Marsilius makes the law binding upon the ruler for 
the simple reason that without the guidance of the law he might easily be led astray, 
either out of ignorance or as a result of an unsuitable emotional disposition (D.I, 
c.11, §5). 
As far as the semantics of the law is concerned, the philosopher distinguishes 
two senses of the term: it might denote “the just” and the “advantageous” or “a 
command … which coerces by means of penalty and reward meted out in this 
world” (D.I, c.10, §4). All laws should satisfy both senses. On the one hand, their 
content should be of benefit to society. On the other, they should derive from a 
prudential and intellectual authority that is capable of imposing them with the threat 
                                                          
6 According to Ullmann (1979: 213), Marsilius “performed a surgical operation” in political theory by 
removing its Christian components. 
 
7 All translations are from Marsilius of Padua (2005) with slight alterations. 
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of sanctions (D.I, c.10, §4). Thus the formal cause of the city’s civic and social 
functionaries is the law, which is expressed in the form of an order to those 
functionaries, who are called upon to implement it. What, however, is the efficient 
cause? What, in other words, is the source of law? The prince, the nobles or the 
multitude?  
It is hard to dispute that for Marsilius no law can be valid if it derives from a 
single individual (D.I, c.12, §8). However, there is an on-going controversy as to 
whether the human legislator consists in the whole body of citizens or in an elite of 
wise or noble men. Let us start with the textual evidence. 
In the third paragraph of chapter 12, Marsilius states that: 
 
“The ‘legislator’ i. e. the primary and proper efficient cause of the law, is 
the people or the [totality] of the citizens (universitas civium) or else its 
[weightier] part (valentior pars), when, by means of an election or will 
expressed in speech in a general assembly of the citizens, it commands or 
determines, subject to temporal penalty or punishment, that something 
should be done or omitted in respect of human civil acts.” 
 
His references to the weightier part of the citizens that run through the first 
Discourse from this point onwards have been a cause of sharp disagreement among 
scholars. Some of them, relying on the very next sentence, which states that the 
weightier part includes “both the quantity and the quality of the persons in the 
community upon which the law is passed”, have concluded that in his reference to 
“quality” the philosopher is favouring aristocratic regimes in which the legislative 
power lies solely in the hands of a few wise or noble men. A typical example of this 
kind of reasoning can be found in Wilks (1964: 194-195), who put forward the view 
that “the greater the importance of the members of the valentior pars, the fewer they 
will need to be in number” as well as the view that, in his use of this term, Marsilius 
is alluding to the seven prince electors who made up the college that elected the rex 
Romanorum of the Holy Roman Empire. And more recently Condren (1980: 306) has 
claimed that the weightier part could only include “two or three magnates 
answerable only to their successors”. 
This interpretation, however, is not supported by the text. On the contrary, 
one has reasons to believe that the weightier part, if it does not represent the whole 
body of the citizens, undoubtedly includes the overwhelming majority of them. Let 
us see why: 
1. Marsilius himself generally uses the terms “totality of the citizens” and “weightier 
part of the citizens” as if they were almost identical in meaning. Moreover, at two 
points (D.I, c.12, §5 and c.13, §2) he explicitly asserts that “they should be taken for 
the same thing”. 
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2. In the fourth paragraph of c. 12 he presents two alternative ways of defining the 
composition of the weightier part. The first is not particularly enlightening as he 
maintains that it should be “identified from the honourable custom of polities”, 
without further clarification. The second way, however, is clearer as in this case 
Marsilius turns to Aristotle’s text and more specifically to the second chapter of the 
sixth book of the Politics. Here the Stageirite does not, of course, state how the 
weightier part is defined, but refers to the basic institutions and the modus operandi of 
the Greek democracies of his time, as well as to certain arguments championed by 
the supporters of popular rule. The chapter ends as follows: 
 
“And from the type of justice that is agreed to be democratic, which 
consists in everyone having numerical equality, comes what is held to be 
most of all a democracy and rule by the people, since equality consists in 
the poor neither ruling more than the rich nor being alone in authority, 
but in all ruling equally on the basis of numerical equality, since in that 
way they would consider equality and freedom to be present in the 
constitution.” (1318a 3-10, C.D.C. Reeve trans.) 
 
Marsilius chooses to refer to a chapter that concludes with the view that for 
the democrats, democracy is a form of government in which both rich and poor 
rule together on equal terms.8 If Marsilius had considered the weightier part to be 
the same as a ruling aristocracy, he would have included other passages from the 
Politics in order to support this view.9 This particular choice of passage, however, 
leads us to the reasonable assumption that in the form of government he is 
proposing, the supreme civil power, i.e. the legislative power, should be in the hands 
of all or most of the citizens.  
3. This view is reinforced by the fact that Marsilius goes on to devote a part of the 
twelfth and all of the thirteenth chapter to refuting the arguments of those who 
claim that the “authority to make laws” should belong to the few and the virtuous 
and not the many and the vicious. He goes to great pains to show both the 
unsuitability of the few for the ascription of such a political privilege and the 
suitability of the many. The few are left out because they might fall into error or the 
laws they would pass might serve their personal or factional interests (D.I, c.12, §8). 
The arguments in favour of the many will be examined later. 
4. It has been argued by Quillet (1988: 560) that the weightier part should be 
conceived in terms of the maior et sanior pars, i.e. the view that decisions regarding the 
                                                          
8 Cf. Mulgan (1991: 317-318) and Keyt’s commentary in Aristotle (1999: 202).  
 
9 A similar line of reasoning is developed by Sullivan (2010), who, however, does not refer to the weightier 
part or the above passage from the Politics but to the democratic arguments in favour of the multitude that 
Marsilius borrows from Aristotle, showing that he embraces them fully. 
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election of ecclesiastical authorities required not only the support of the majority of 
the electoral body but also sound judgement on the part of those who made up the 
majority. She maintains that, in this context, Marsilius believed that only a handful 
of citizens were sufficiently qualified to participate in the weightier part and she 
reaches the conclusion that the philosopher must have had in mind the Electoral 
College mentioned above. However, even if we accept her premises, which are not 
supported by textual evidence, the conclusion she draws does not necessarily follow 
from them. We know that the Third Lateran Council that was convened in 1179 had 
decreed that for papal elections a “two-thirds majority ipso facto constituted the sanior 
pars of the electorate” (Monahan 1987: 140). Indeed, as time passed this 
interpretation came to prevail in other ecclesiastical elections. Consequently, even if 
Marsilius had had the maior et sanior pars in mind, in no way could this have meant 
that the minority should rule over the majority. 
On the basis of these and other arguments,10 it is reasonable to assume that a 
polity in which the primary legislative power belongs to the weightier part of its 
citizens is a polity in which the laws are made with the wide participation of 
commoners. It is possible that Marsilius may have accepted a few other exclusions 
from the citizen body apart from the customary ones he mentions in c.12, §4 
(children, slaves, aliens and women), but in no way would these have led to a body 
politic comprised only of the nobles or the wise. 
The totality of citizens or the weightier part that represents it, can legislate 
directly or through the election of prudent and experienced men. These men should 
lay the new laws before the whole body of citizens, or the weightier part of them 
“for approval or rejection, so that if any citizen thinks that anything needs to be 
added to them or taken away, changed or totally repudiated he can say so: because 
as a result of this process the law can be more expediently framed” (D.I, c.13, §8, cf. 
c.12, §5).11 The above passage shows Marsilius’ complete faith in the citizen body, 
granting them the power not only to ratify or reject the proposals of certain 
“specialists” or “experts” but also to form the content of the laws (changing them 
                                                          
10 Cf. Nederman’s (1995: 68) argument that “because citizenship itself arises from a horizon of diverse 
functions and roles, all of which require voice and deserve attention, it is not possible to eliminate large 
numbers of citizens from the exercise of effective involvement within their own community, because to do so 
would be to remove the multiplicity of perspectives that Marsiglio deems to be necessary for the realization 
of the common good and the maintenance of public peace”. 
 
11 Marsilius alludes once to the alternative possibility of electing representatives who can take the 
responsibilities of the whole citizen body including the ratification and rejection of laws. However, this can be 
done only on condition that the laws have previously been discussed before the whole body of citizens to 
make their own comments (D.I, c.13, §8). This suggestion of his is faintly reminiscent of the way modern 
representative democracies are structured, although a wide initial deliberation on the proposed laws is not 
very common. It is interesting to note that, although Marsilius’ human legislator can function effectively only 
within the framework of a face-to-face society, certain of the philosopher’s proposals, such as the election of 
an executive authority and a legislative body by the whole electorate or the majority of it, would potentially 
make democratic rule possible in geographic areas of greater size than the medieval city-states.  
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wherever considered necessary), according to the will of the majority.12 This is a far 
cry from what can be found even in important later works of the 16th and 17th 
centuries that subscribe to some form of popular sovereignty.13  
What happens, however, with the other forms of civil power? Marsilius 
believes that the citizens should entrust the power to implement laws to a ruler (or a 
ruling group), which implies that this magistrate could “judge, command and 
execute sentences of what is advantageous or just in civil terms” (D.I, c.15, §6). The 
Marsilian ruler, envisaged as a bearer of a unified, indivisible and constitutive 
                                                          
12 On the basis of the following passage, it can be assumed that decisions would be made on a majority basis: 
“[I]t is not always easy or even possible for all persons to agree upon one opinion because some individuals 
have a stunted nature … But things that are to the common advantage should not be impeded or neglected 
because of the irrational objection or opposition of these people. The authority to pass or to institute laws 
belongs, therefore, solely to [the totality] of the citizens or its [weightier] part” (D.I, c.12, §5). Marsilius 
concedes that it is unrealistic to expect from every member of the citizenry to think in terms of the common 
good (D.I, c.12, §8). Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the majority principle is the only method of 
decision-making that neutralises the views of the vicious and ignorant few in a relatively fair manner. Cf. also 
D.I, c.13, §3. For an opposing view, according to which Marsilius presents “a notion of free individuals in a 
multitude of free men whose corporate will about the common good necessarily is the same”, see Coleman 
(2000: 154). 
13 For example, the Florentine Renaissance political thinker Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540), in Del modo 
di ordinare il governo popolare (1512), claims that laws should normally be debated by small bodies and put 
forward only for approval to the wider-based consiglio grande. See Guicciardini (1997: 211). Of particular 
interest is the case of the German Calvinist political thinker Johannes Althusius (1557-1638). In his work 
Politica (1603) sovereignty resides with the commonwealth or the associated body, namely the “citizens and 
inhabitants of the realm” who are bearers of collective rights. The people, however, do not appear to perform 
any political function apart from appointing by consensus an administrative elite of wealthy citizens, the 
college of ephors, to pursue the common good on their behalf, as well as appointing the supreme ruler and 
censuring him for any aberration. The ephors make all the political decisions, since Althusius believes that it 
is not feasible for the citizens to vote. Also, it is the ephors that enact the law, which is none other than the 
law of God, in its various manifestations. It should be noted that Althusius is prepared to accept that, in the 
absence of ephors, their powers would be necessarily delegated to the people as a whole, who would decide 
by consensus, although this is an extreme case that should not be pursued. See Althusius (1995: 105-122).  
Finally, the English political philosopher and republican theorist James Harrington (1611-1677), in his 
imaginary Oceana (1656), entrusts the senate with the competence to debate laws, while granting to a 
representative assembly of citizens only the right to reject, approve of, or refer for further debate, the 
legislative proposals of the senate. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that whoever introduces issues for 
debate at the said popular assembly should be punished with death. The reason underlying this exclusion 
might be his overriding conviction that the “wisdom of the commonwealth” lies in “a natural aristocracy”, 
which has all the qualifications necessary for successfully guiding the people. It is obvious that such a move 
considerably reduces the scope of popular sovereignty with regard to the making of laws, as it deprives the 
citizens of the power to determine the content of the laws. However, it should be admitted that the current 
practice of legislating exclusively through elected representatives without any essential involvement of the 
citizens is much worse. See Harrington (1992: 23-24, 126 and 167). As regards Marsilius’ contemporaries, the 
debate on sovereignty is confined to justifying the sovereignty of the ruler, who, in the best of cases, should 
be bound in his legislative activities by principles of morality and natural law, and should observe the 
agreements with his subjects. See Quaglioni (2012: 65-75) and Pennington (1993). However, medieval Italian 
city-states had developed political institutions in which the people as a whole were sporadically acting as 
sovereign and the idea of popular consent as a prerequisite for making valid laws was taken seriously among 
certain jurists. It is reasonable to assume that these developments had a profound effect on Marsilius’ 
thought. For a detailed account see Ferente (2016). 
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power,14 is also assigned with the duty to fill all the positions that are required for 
the successful execution of the city’s functions, and particularly its judicial and 
military functions, with the appropriate number of properly qualified citizens. For 
obvious reasons, Marsilius gives particular importance to defining the military 
powers of the ruler. The “armed force of the prince must be determined by the 
legislator” and should be large enough to impose justice and protect the polity 
effectively, though not so large as to tempt the prince to exploit it for his own ends 
(D.I, c.14, §8). Finally, in order to be able to implement the law, as defined by the 
human legislator, effectively, the ruler should possess certain virtues, such as 
prudence (which for Marsilius means sound judgement), justice and equity (in order 
to overcome the shortcomings and imperfections of the law) (D.I, c.14). 
The question of the ruler’s establishment and supervision is of particular 
importance to Marsilius. With regard to the former, in chapter 16 Marsilius sets out 
ten arguments employed by the advocates of hereditary monarchy in order to refute 
them one by one, promoting the view that the ruler should always be elected by the 
whole citizen body or the weightier part of it. However, the general philosophical 
grounds for supporting the election of rulers have already been put forward in c.15, 
§3:  
“[S]ince it belongs to the [totality] of citizens to generate the form 
according to which all civil acts must be regulated, sc. the law, it will be 
evident that it belongs to the same body to determine the matter or 
subject of this form, to which it belongs to settle the civil actions of men 
in accordance with this form: viz. the princely part.” 
 
In other words, the legislative procedures in which the body politic directly 
participates would be incomplete if this body were unable to appoint the person (or 
persons) to whom it sought to entrust the faithful implementation of its decisions. 
However, once the citizens entrust the ruler with the execution of their legislative 
decisions, they have the right to turn against him if he betrays their trust. On this 
thorny issue Marsilius is not satisfied with general and vague allusions but, in 
chapter 18, offers us the outline of a legislative framework for indicting, punishing 
and expelling the ruler.15 Thus, he believes that, in order to protect the polity and 
                                                          
14 Marsilius, evidently affected by the chaos caused by the disputes over issues of political authority that were 
common in his day, considers it essential to devote an entire chapter, the seventeenth, to promoting the view 
that the absence of a unified and hierarchically structured executive and judicial power leads to “the 
destruction of the city or the kingdom”. 
 
15 Monahan (1987: 213) has claimed that Marsilius is simply expressing the widespread medieval belief that 
popular assent to the establishment of a ruler entailed “nothing more than acclamation or concurrence for an 
otherwise designated ruler”. If this, however, were the case, then why would Marsilius have gone to such 
great lengths to convince his readers that they should in no way tolerate hereditary succession to power? In 
addition, one may wonder whether the formal or customary character of popular assent is compatible with 
the view that the human legislator should punish the ruler when he violates the laws he is called upon to 
implement. 
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avoid arbitrary rule, there should be legal provisions making the executive authority 
answerable to the people. If the prince is found to be guilty of a trivial violation of 
the law, which is of a transient character, he should not be punished because such 
an action would without good reason shake the citizens’ faith in him, causing more 
harm than good. However, if the ruler persists in breaking the law, he should suffer 
sanctions because his behaviour is detrimental to the city’s welfare. It goes without 
saying that the legislator has a range of penalties to choose from, which include the 
prince’s suspension for a short period of time (D.I, c.18, §3) and, of course, his 
ultimate dismissal (D.I, c.15, §2). Looking at Marsilius’ overall description of the 
ruler, we can safely assert that the supreme magistrate is merely an executive organ 
that is subject to correction by the totality of the citizens who brought him into 
office. The only element that smacks of monarchy is his election for life (D.I, c.16, 
§1), although, with the tight constraints imposed by Marsilius, it is very likely that, if 
the Marsilian polity ever took shape, most princes would end their lives as ordinary 
citizens. 
Marsilius could hardly be unaware of the fact that his emphasis on popular 
rule would appear arbitrary and far-fetched to his audience. For this reason the 
philosopher feels the need to provide a series of arguments some of which are 
quite extensively developed while others are less so in order to justify the granting 
of full political sovereignty to the many. Let us look at the most basic of them: 
 
a) The first argument (D.I, c.13, §2) aims to show that it is impossible that the many 
should desire the harm of the city, since “nothing is desired by the same specific 
nature, in its greater part and directly, at the same time as its destruction; for such a 
desire would be void”. For this reason the multitude can only desire what is 
beneficial and just for the polity. If the opposite happened, nature (and art which 
imitates nature) would err and be deficient, which would be at odds with the 
findings of the natural science. The next two arguments present reasons suggesting 
that the many, far from merely not wishing to harm the city, can and should play an 
active role in seeking the common good, as expressed in the laws that they draw up 
and approve as a collective body. 
b) Marsilius briefly invokes Aristotle’s user argument, according to which certain 
things can be assessed much more effectively by those who use them than by those 
who make them.16 As he points out in c.13, §3 “many make a correct judgment of 
the quality of the picture, house, ship or other work of art, who would nonetheless 
not know how to invent one themselves”. Just as the quality of a rudder can be 
judged better by the helmsman who uses it than the carpenter who made it, so can 
the content of laws be judged better by those who are called to conform to them 
than by an aloof lawgiver. To provide a modern example, nobody needs special 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
16 Politics, 1282a 17-23. 
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knowledge to understand the effects that an increase or decrease in their income tax 
would have on their lifestyle, or to understand the consequences of the abolition of 
the public health system. Consequently, the citizens should have a direct and 
substantial involvement in the legislative process. Marsilius wholeheartedly endorses 
the user argument and believes it to be empirically obvious. 
c) The most basic argument, however, judging by the space that Marsilius devotes to 
it, is the multitude argument.17 Aristotle, in his attempt to show that the many are fit 
to elect their rulers, advances the argument that when a crowd of people of limited 
abilities confer together, they make better decisions than those that would be taken 
by a small group of individuals with greater knowledge and abilities. Marsilius now 
“extends the validity of this doctrine to legislation and assigns the assembly of the 
citizens a broader range of powers than Aristotle, who confined himself to granting 
the people only deliberative and judicial functions” (Syros, 2006: 237).18 As has 
already been mentioned, Marsilius claims that the multitude should always have the 
upper hand in lawmaking. He recognises, of course, that it is not possible for 
anyone to draft legislative proposals, but he insists that the members of the 
multitude are able “to discern [true and useful insights concerning legislation] once 
they have been discovered by others … and judge whether there is anything in what 
has been proposed which seems to need being added or taken away, completely 
changed or rejected” (D.I, c.13, §7). Marsilius, following Aristotle, appears to believe 
that it is collective deliberations what he calls in c.12, §5 “the hearing … of the 
entire multitude” (ex auditu universe multitudinis civium) that produce what is right 
and beneficial for the polity, especially when the educated can also express their 
opinions. Thus, Marsilius’ reference to “the quality and quantity of the persons” in 
the weightier part does not entail a contradiction, since when the many decide 
collectively they acquire a quality they do not possess as individuals.  
d) The final argument aims to show that the multitude is capable not only of judging 
and legislating wisely but also of implementing the legislative decisions it takes of its 
own accord. Thomas Aquinas, in discussing the Roman Republic in a relatively 
favourable light in the fourth chapter of De regno, argues that if there is no 
monarchical power the common people “no longer regard the common good as if it 
belonged to someone else, but each now regards it as his own” (2002: 15).19 If, 
                                                          
17 Politics, 1281a 42 – 1281b 38. 
 
18 In the above article Marsilius’ argument is compared with the work of other political thinkers of his time, 
such as Peter of Auvergne, Nicholas de Vaudémont and Jean de Jandun, who made assiduous efforts to 
divest the multitude of any vestige of substantive political power. 
 
19 Cf. a similar argument that is offered by Bartolus of Sassoferrato in his Tractatus de regimine civitatis (c. 1330): 
“[I]f the multitude is in command, assuming that they look to their own good, they nonetheless withdraw 
from the common good no further, in so doing, than if one person were ruling and were acting for his 
personal good: therefore it is better to be ruled by many” (Bartolus of Sassoferrato, 1997). This argument, 
which appears in a variety of forms, presupposes that the common good of the polity is equal to the common 
or non-conflicting interests of all its members. Consequently, in a democracy the pursuit of (at least) certain 
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however, the common good is connected with the legislative process, since this 
process aims to determine what is just and beneficial for the city, then the 
participation of all in this process is essential. In this way the citizens who agree on a 
law will perceive it as being their own work and as promoting the common good, 
and any of them “will better observe a law that he seems to have imposed on 
himself” (D.I, c.12, §6). On the other hand, if a citizen feels that the law is alien to 
him and imposed on him from above, he will have difficulty in abiding by it or he 
might do it for the wrong reasons.20 Marsilius concludes that it is better for citizens 
to observe laws that they themselves have created, even if they are not flawless, than 
to have a system of perfect laws that are never implemented or implemented only 
improperly (D.I, c.12, §6). 21 
 
II 
 
If these, in short, are the basic ideas expressed in the first Discourse of 
Defensor pacis, how can they be understood in more general terms and what is their 
place in the history of Western political thought? The answer to these questions can 
be neither simple nor definite, yet I shall attempt an interpretation of Marsilius’ 
political philosophy that seems to me more faithful to what he actually said.  
It has been argued by Tierney (1982: 48) that Marsilius simply applied 
though he expanded it further “to both secular and ecclesiastical government” 
a consent theory that was popular among many political thinkers of the 14th century. 
We know, however, that the concept of consent is such an ambiguous one that it 
can be applied both in the case of a tyrannical regime which is merely tolerated 
through the passive acceptance of all those who live under it (Locke’s tacit consent)22 
and also in the case of a modern democratic regime in which the citizens express 
their consent by electing those who will exercise the legislative and supreme 
                                                                                                                                                                          
personal interests and of the collective interest coincide. If it is also borne in mind that in a democracy all 
citizens are considered equal and nobody is more powerful than anybody else, the pursuit of the common 
good is easier. On the other hand, in a monarchy, if the supreme ruler desires to rule justly and wisely, he 
should consciously align himself with the interests of the many, often setting aside his own interests, and this 
is not so easy, considering his ability to impose his will on his subjects. Bartolus drawing on Roman law 
argues for a form of representative government from which several classes could be excluded and it is 
confined to small city-states.  
 
20 Cf. Politics, 1281b 28-30. 
 
21 It should be noted that both the user argument and the multitude argument have had a successful career in 
modern democratic theory and even today are used (in different versions) to defend aspects of popular 
sovereignty. See, on this point, Peonidis (2008: 283-294 and 2013: 7-11). In the context of modern liberal 
democracy, the fourth argument seems somewhat outdated, though not because we think it is a bad argument 
but because citizens are rarely directly involved in normal legislative procedures. Cf. note 30 below. 
 
22 See Locke (1980: 63-64). 
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executive power. Therefore, it is important to see how Marsilius understands this 
concept at the few points in the first Discourse where it occurs. The first time it is 
mentioned is in c.8, §3, where the author, following Aristotle, states that in 
“tempered” systems of government (monarchies, aristocracies, polities) power is 
exercised with the consent of the citizens.23 However, apart from this particularly 
broad use of the term “consent” to denote the approval given by subjects/citizens 
to three completely different systems of government, another, more specific use of 
it appears in connection with the system of government preferred by Marsilius 
himself. Thus, in c.13, §8 and c.17, §2, the citizens as a whole consent to comply 
with the laws which they themselves have established, and also to the 
implementation of these laws solely by officials that they themselves have selected 
for this purpose.24 Therefore, here people’s consent amounts in effect to their 
agreeing to participate in a form of democratic regime. Consequently, Marsilius’ 
political theory is not primarily about consent but about a form of popular rule to 
which the whole body politic has every reason to consent.  
It seems more appropriate to understand Marsilius, if not as a “radical 
democrat” (Gierke, 1900: 46), at least as a democratic thinker. However, one now 
runs into a new set of problems. If “consent” is an ambiguous concept, then 
“democracy” is an “essentially contested concept”. In what sense, then, can a 
thinker of the past be accurately described as democratic? I shall begin by defining 
in what sense Marsilius is not a democratic thinker. 
Marsilius is undoubtedly not a champion of democracy in the sense he 
attributes to it in c.8, §3, namely that of a failed system of government in which the 
“mass” or “multitude” of the poor, which comprises the majority of the citizen 
body, wields power over the rest.25 This is an Aristotelian notion that haunted the 
term “democracy” until at least the early 19th century and made its use prohibitive, 
since no political thinker wanted to be associated with a system of government that 
most believed was synonymous with anarchy, arbitrariness, factionalism and, 
occasionally, with radical views concerning the redistribution of property.26 Also, 
Marsilius is not a champion of what we now call “liberal democracy”. This term has 
come to mean a system in which the decisions of the majority should be taken 
within a framework defined by a set of constitutionally entrenched rights, in order 
to prevent not only the abuse of power by the elected elites in whom power has 
                                                          
23 Cf. D.I, c.9, §5.  
 
24 It is possible to discern the specific sense that Marsilius reserves for the citizens’ consent by comparing it 
with the completely different type of consent given by the multitude of men in Hobbes’ Leviathan, in which 
they entrust the exercise of all political powers to a sovereign in return for their protection and security.    
 
25 See Syros (2012: 92-93).  
 
26 See inter alia, Innes and Philp (2013). The Aristotelian definition is given in Politics, 1290b 17-19. 
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been vested but also the possibility of the minority being tyrannised by the majority. 
These rights have historically been understood to be natural rights, but what really 
matter in the polity outlined by Marsilius are positive law and the collective process 
of promoting the common good, and not any natural (pre-political) individual rights 
that citizens might possess from birth.27 
However, Marsilius of the first Discourse can be regarded as an exponent of 
democratic ideas in the following two senses. In a previous work, I proposed a 
model that lists a minimum number of conditions an existing or imaginary political 
regime (whatever its name) should meet in order for it to be characterised as an 
essentially democratic one. This model arose from an attempt to seek and highlight 
the common features shared by ancient and modern democracies. More specifically, 
I claimed that: 
 
“1. Democracy is conceived as rule by the people over a particular 
territory. 
2. Popular rule or sovereignty means not only that the people are bearers 
of political power, but also that they should constitute the ultimate 
source from which every form of political power exercised within their 
territory emanates 
3. The people are understood to be a set of individuals who satisfy the 
following necessary (but not always sufficient) conditions: (a) they are 
native-born and (b) their number is greater than the number of those 
belonging to the upper class, defined by any principle of distinction 
recognized in their society. 
4. The people rule in the following ways: 
a. They participate directly in political decision-making, and/or they 
freely appoint officials who decide on their behalf.  
b. They are not unfairly disqualified from holding political office. 
c. Appointed officials are accountable to the people. This accountability 
implies that all its members should have the power of auditing their 
officials and, among other things, of pursuing their replacement with 
others, if the members are not satisfied with the officials’ performance.” 
(Peonidis 2013: 1-5) 
 
If this model is applied to the regime presented in the first Discourse of 
Defensor pacis, we find that it meets most of the conditions allowing us to describe it 
as democratic. The people participate directly in the exercise of legislative power 
                                                          
27 In the first Discourse the only reference to natural law is in c. 19, §13, where it is considered to be the 
foundation of the individual’s moral obligation to avoid and prevent wrongdoing. 
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and indirectly in the exercise of executive power by electing one or more officials to 
whom they entrust the duty of implementing the laws.28 Further, they consist not of 
the higher class of the noble or the wise but of the whole body of citizens or the 
overwhelming majority of them. As far as condition 4 (b) is concerned, although at 
two points Marsilius mentions the Aristotelian contention that the king or the 
highest functionaries should be chosen from the class of notables (D.I, c. 13, §4, c. 
16, §3), he himself does not appear to share this view. On the contrary, in c. 16, §17 
he makes it absolutely clear that the rulers could come from one particular family 
only if the legislator considers it appropriate, provided that the family’s ancestors 
have displayed prudence and virtue, while he does not omit to note, calling upon 
relevant passages from Aristotle, that the families of nobles are often prone to 
corruption and decay. If we also take into account the fact that in c. 14, §8 Marsilius 
holds that would-be rulers should not possess their own armed forces before their 
selection because, if they did, “no virtuous poor men would ever be raised to the 
principate” [emphasis mine], we may assume that he would probably disqualify 
citizens from occupying the supreme political office only on grounds of moral 
wickedness.29 Finally, as has already been mentioned, the whole legislative 
framework that is put forward to provide checks on the prince (including the power 
to remove him from office) renders him totally accountable to the whole body of 
the citizens or the weightier part of it. 
In addition, Marsilius can be regarded as belonging to the democratic 
tradition in a second sense as well. Rousseau, whose work forms an integral part of 
the basic corpus of democratic political theory, as it became consolidated during the 
18th century, claimed that the legislative power belongs exclusively to the people, 
whose sovereignty can be neither represented nor alienated, while the executive 
power can be entrusted to a governing body charged “with the maintenance of 
freedom, both civil and political”.30 Rousseau, of course, does not make such an 
extensive use of Aristotle and is considered to be a particularly original political 
                                                          
28 One difference between Marsilius’ regime and other historical democratic regimes is that in the latter the 
elected officials are not elected for life but only for a short term. Nevertheless, this ‘undemocratic’ element is 
counterbalanced by the direct participation of the people in the legislative procedure. It is noteworthy that 
Hobbes (1979: 246) holds that in commonwealths where the there is “an elective King, whose power is 
limited to his life” the sovereignty lies in the assembly who elected him. These commonwealths are either 
democratic or aristocratic. 
 
29 Cf. the view he develops in c.16, §21 that there is nothing objectionable about the desire of any “prudent 
and worthy” citizen to rise to the office of ruler. 
 
30 Rousseau (1997: 83, 113-118). However, caution is needed to avoid finding similarities beyond the 
structural one mentioned above. For instance, I would have reservations about accepting D’ Entréves’ (1965: 
75) suggestion that Marsilius was a forerunner of Rousseau in developing the idea of the “general will”. I am 
not sure whether Marsilius would agree with the view that “when a law is proposed in the People’s assembly, 
what they are being asked is not exactly whether they approve the proposal or reject it, but whether it does or 
does not conform to the general will, which is theirs” (Rousseau 1997: 124). Perhaps he would simply say that 
the common good would be determined through deliberation. 
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thinker, yet we cannot fail to notice a basic similarity in the structure of the 
democratic regime envisioned by these two men.31 
Throughout the Middle Ages there were very few ideas that recalled 
something of the democratic achievements of the ancients; amongst these ideas 
stood out the principles of Roman law leges nulla alia ex causa nos teneant, quam quod 
iudicio populi receptae sunt (Digest 1.3.32) and quod omnes similiter tangit, ab omnibus 
comprobetur (Code 5.59.5.2). Marsilius of the first Discourse is perhaps the first 
medieval political thinker to succeed in describing and defending in a systematic and 
unwavering manner a form of government based on popular sovereignty. Although 
his attempt had no immediate followers, the publication of this work sufficed, in my 
opinion, to secure Marsilius an important place in the history of democratic ideas.32 
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